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Mass Protests and 
the Military
Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer
Aurel Croissant is professor of political science at Heidelberg Uni-
versity. In 2017, he was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the 
National Endowment for Democracy. David Kuehn is senior research 
fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg. Tanja 
Eschenauer is a research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at 
Heidelberg University.
Over the last four decades, countries ruled by authoritarian regimes have
seen a proliferation of nonviolent mass protests. Whether called “people 
power” movements, color revolutions, campaigns of nonviolent resis-
tance, or nonviolent revolutions, these organized demands for democratic 
change have challenged dictators across wide swaths of the world. Such 
movements have succeeded to varying degrees and in different ways, but 
scholars agree that the response of state-security forces—and especially 
the military—is key.1 The lesson might be summed up this way: If a pro-
test movement wants to trigger a transition toward democracy, one of the 
best things it can do is to spur a loyalty shift within the military.
The emphasis on the military is important. Some studies conflate 
military behavior during authoritarian regime crises with actions un-
dertaken by state-security forces in general. That is a mistake. Secu-
rity forces comprise an array of distinct institutions—not just the regu-
lar, uniformed military but also intelligence agencies, various kinds of 
police services, government militias, and maybe even hired thugs and 
goons.2 For a dictator, however, deploying troops trained and equipped 
to wield military-grade force is the last line of defense. If soldiers and 
tanks appear in the streets, it is a sure sign that the dictatorship’s threat 
assessment has started to “flash red”: The hour when routine repression 
could have put a lid on things has passed, and the regime faces a state 
of emergency. The stakes mount, as does the potential for serious vio-
lence. Protesters must prepare to brave graver physical dangers, regime 
insiders find it harder to coordinate among themselves, and top military 
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officers become able to demand political and economic concessions in 
exchange for defending the incumbent.
It is also important to note that protesters are likely to help their cause 
by remaining nonviolent: Two recent quantitative studies suggest that 
the nonviolent character of mass uprisings in and of itself positively 
influences the likelihood of elite defections and campaign success.3 
Few studies have investigated the relationship between military reac-
tions to nonviolent protest campaigns and subsequent political outcomes.4 
The relationship is not dispositive, of course: A dictator can fall even if 
the military attacks nonviolent protesters. Conversely, military support 
for such protests cannot guarantee that successful democratization will 
come about. Many causal factors, some contingent and some structural, 
are at play in determining whether an autocratic ruler or regime stands or 
falls, and what happens afterward. One set of authoritarian incumbents 
might be replaced by a new one, or protests might be met by a successful 
crackdown that sets the stage for renewed authoritarianism.
Although peaceful protests are common under authoritarianism,5 by 
themselves they pose a fairly minor threat to the survival of autocrats 
and authoritarian regimes. According to one dataset, only 7 percent of 
all autocratic leaders who fell between 1950 and 2012 did so due to 
nonviolent mass protests. By contrast, fully a third of all these fallen 
authoritarians succumbed to military or other insiders’ coups. Yet the 
incidence of coups, especially the full-scale military kind, has sharply 
declined since the 1980s, while the number of leader exits through non-
violent mass protests in autocracies has substantially risen.6 
The paradoxical character of these trends—leader exits becoming 
more common even as coups become rarer—may result from the com-
plexity of the real-world cases on which these statistics are based. Popu-
lar protests, the threat of a coup d’état, and a revolution by the citizens 
may have close interconnections, so that what appears to be a “regu-
lar” leader exit, for instance, may actually be the result of a soft palace 
coup. For instance, Erich Honecker stepped down as the head of East 
Germany’s ruling communist party and Slobodan Miloševiæ resigned as 
president of Serbia “voluntarily.” Yet in each case, mass protests were 
a crucial part of the story. Honecker gave poor health as his reason for 
leaving in October 1989, but in truth other members of the East Ger-
man communist elite had been pressing him to quit out of worry that his 
hard-line approach to escalating mass protests would take them all down 
(they got rid of the unpopular Honecker but soon fell anyway). In 2000, 
similarly, Miloševiæ opted not to mention the ongoing protests in his 
resignation statement, preferring to cite instead a decision by the nation-
al election commission, but everyone knew that he was only saving face. 
Miloševiæ’s fall was a preview of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution and 
Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution in that mass protests erupting after a 
suspect election were the key event. In early 2011, long-ruling dictator 
143Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer
Hosni Mubarak found himself relieved of the presidency of Egypt by a 
bloodless military coup although there had been no triggering election. 
Yet the mass protests of the Arab Spring had been roiling the country, 
and these moved the Egyptian army to act against him. In another vein, 
the protests in Libya and Syria that same year began as exercises in non-
violence, but were met with brutal military assaults by the Muammar al-
Qadhafi and Bashar al-Assad dictatorships, respectively. In each country, 
the situation soon degenerated into a bloody, multisided civil war, with 
the regular military splitting up to fight on different sides.7
The Dictator’s Endgame
The problems of differentiating among overlapping empirical phe-
nomena are too many to solve in a single essay. Our more modest aim, 
therefore, is to better understand how military leaders respond to one 
particular type of popular protest, and how the response they choose af-
fects regime trajectories from that point. 
Our focus is on situations in which a mostly peaceful mass protest 
movement demands regime change, or at least the dictator’s resigna-
tion. Prior attempts, if any, to demobilize the protests through negotia-
tions and political liberalization have failed. While the dictator tries to 
cling to power, police and other domestic security forces prove unable 
to contain swelling demonstrations. The dictator then feels a need to 
deploy the military. The threat or reality of military force becomes the 
necessary (though not sufficient) means to ensure the dictator’s political 
survival.8 We call this situation the “dictator’s endgame.” 
How the military responds helps to determine the prospects for leader 
exit or survival, regime collapse or renewal, and the emergence or fail-
ure of democracy. During a campaign of mass protest, military lead-
ers must decide whether to defend the dictator against the opposition, 
which requires the application of some degree of military-grade vio-
lence against unarmed opponents, or to defect from the dictator. Most 
scholars assume it to be the default situation that a nation’s military 
can behave as a coherent, unitary actor. They also tend to assume that 
a military establishment—like any large and complex bureaucratic or-
ganization—has institutional interests of its own that its members seek 
to advance, as well as certain broad political outcomes that it fears or 
favors. A final assumption is that the leaders at the top of the military 
hierarchy have the most influence in defining and acting on behalf of 
such vested “military interests.”9
A military’s defection from a regime can take a softer or a harder form. 
The softer form is a loyalty shift; the harder form is the making of a coup. 
A loyalty shift takes place when the military declines to apply large-scale 
military force despite the dictator’s order or request that it do so. Some 
militaries have defected by simply remaining in their barracks, as the 
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South Korean army did in 1960 and the military forces of communist 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany did in 1989. 
A more active form of loyalty shift occurs when a military, without 
actually launching a coup, nonetheless signals its support for the re-
gime’s opponents. This happened when the armed forces backed anti-
Marcos “people power” in the Philippines in 1986. It occurred in Ro-
mania three years after that—at least at first, for within days soldiers 
tried and shot dictator Nicolae Ceauºescu and his wife. And it played 
out in Tunisia in early 2011, when smiling troops climbed out of their 
armored vehicles to fraternize and take pictures with demonstrators who 
had turned out to denounce the regime of President Zine al-Abidine Ben 
Ali. Staying quartered and showing support for the opposition both sig-
nal that the dictator can no longer count on the military. 
The second and harder type of defection is the coup d’état, when the 
military (sometimes working with civilian elites) tries to unseat the dic-
tator and seize power, if only temporarily. Examples include the Egyp-
tian events of 2011 already mentioned, as well as events in Pakistan 
in March 1969, when General Yahya Khan declared martial law and 
installed a military government, and Haiti in early 1986, when General 
Henri Namphy took power at the head of a mixed military-civilian in-
terim government after dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier had 
fled to France. 
The alternative to soft or hard defection is “repression,” meaning 
the organized use of large-scale military violence by the armed forces 
against protesters with the aim of putting down the mass unrest. Nonvio-
lent mass protests that were met with brutal force include workers’ pro-
tests in Poland in 1956 and 1970; student protests in China in 1989; the 
“8-8-88 Uprising” and the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” in Burma; and the 
campaigns of unarmed protest in Bahrain, Libya, and Syria in early 2011. 
The decision to defect is something that takes place on the institutional 
level. It should not be confused with politically or morally motivated de-
sertions by individual soldiers or officers, which may take place after 
troops have engaged the protesters. In Syria, President Assad successfully 
ordered crack military units to move violently against protesters; later, 
this triggered a significant number of troop desertions. In China in June 
1989, there were isolated reports of soldiers fraternizing with demonstra-
tors, but no intact unit joined the opposition when the People’s Liberation 
Army moved in with Type 59 main battle tanks and soldiers killed hun-
dreds of unarmed protesters in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.
Trends and Patterns
Based on our strict criteria for classification, we examined the hun-
dreds of major civil-resistance campaigns listed in the Nonviolent and 
Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) v.2.0 dataset to identify 
145Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer
cases that satisfied our definition of a “dictator’s endgame.” Because 
NAVCO v.2.0 covers only the years 1946 through 2006, and because 
the variables included in the dataset do not differentiate between the 
military and other security forces, we did additional research. This con-
sisted of surveying other databases, studying a wealth of scholarly and 
media sources, and interviewing experts—all with the goals of extend-
ing coverage through 2014 and categorizing the military’s initial reac-
tion in each case going all the way back to 1946. In order to determine 
whether protests took place under a given autocratic regime, we used 
and updated the Autocratic Regimes Dataset.10 
The forty cases listed in the Table represent 51 percent of all 79 
mass-protest campaigns included in our augmented version of NAVCO 
v.2.0. Each of these 79 campaigns was a) predominantly nonviolent, b) 
directed against the incumbent regime, and c) aimed at regime change 
or at least a change of leader. To form the Table, we eliminated any case 
that lacked at least medium-scale repression, in keeping with the as-
sumption that the dictator will seek to call in the military only after the 
civilian security apparatus has tried and failed to stop the protests. (See 
our online Appendix for a more detailed description of how we identi-
fied the endgames included in the Table.)11 As a group, the regimes 
cases shown in the Table represent all the major types of authoritarian 
governments. They exhibit varying levels of repressiveness and come 
from an array of geographical regions; historical, cultural, and political 
circumstances; and decades, starting with the 1950s and ending with 
the 2010s. A country may appear in Table twice (as do Egypt, Poland, 
and Thailand) or even thrice (as does South Korea), owing to distinct 
episodes that took place within it at different times. 
As the data indicate, the most likely military reaction to a nonvio-
lent mass-protest movement is repression, with a loyalty shift being 
second-likeliest and a coup being the least likely response. Thus in 
nearly half the cases (19), the military engaged in large-scale repres-
sion. In another 15 cases (or 37 percent), the military shifted its loyalty 
from the dictator to the opposition. Only in six cases did the military 
stage a coup. The great bulk (32) of these “dictator’s endgame” sce-
narios took place after 1980, with close to a third of the total (12) com-
ing since the year 2000. 
These results cohere with the findings of recent research regarding 
nonviolent revolutions. Most of our “endgames” fall into one of three 
temporal clusters. These clusters correlate, respectively, with: 1) the 
democratic revolutions of the “third wave” of global democratization 
during the 1980s and 1990s; 2) the “color revolutions” of the 2000s; 
and 3) the Arab uprisings of 2011. The largest cluster, comprising 21 
cases, is the one that correlates with the third wave. In five of the seven 
cases before the third wave (these early cases span the years from 1956 
through 1973), militaries opted to repress protests. Likewise, in the eight 
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 Year Military
Response
Leader Exit 
Within 1 Year
Transition 
Within 3 Years
Democracy 
After 5 Years
Before 1974
Poland 1956 R Yes No No
Venezuela 1958 R Yes Yes Yes
South Korea 1960 L Yes Yes No
Pakistan 1969 C Yes No Yes
Poland 1970 R Yes No No
Greece 1973 R Yes Yes Yes
Thailand 1973 R Yes Yes No
1974–99 (incl. Third Wave)
Iran 1978 R Yes No No
South Korea 1980 R No No No
Argentina 1982 L Yes Yes Yes
Pakistan 1983 R No No Yes
Sudan 1985 C Yes Yes No
Haiti 1986 C Yes No No
Philippines 1986 L Yes Yes Yes
South Korea 1987 L Yes Yes Yes
Burma 1988 R Yes No No
China 1989 R No No No
CSSR 1989 L Yes Yes Yes
GDR 1989 L Yes Yes Yes
Romania 1989 L Yes No Yes
Albania 1990 L No No No
Bangladesh 1990 L Yes Yes Yes
Madagascar 1991 L No Yes Yes
Mali 1991 R Yes Yes Yes
Thailand 1992 R Yes Yes Yes
Malawi 1993 L Yes Yes Yes
Nigeria 1993 R Yes No No
Indonesia 1998 L Yes Yes Yes
2000–2009 (incl. Color Revolutions)
Serbia 2000 L Yes Yes Yes
Kyrgyzstan 2005 L Yes No No
Burma 2007 R No No No
Iran 2009 R No No No
2010–14 (incl. Arab Uprisings)
Bahrain 2011 R No No No
Egypt 2011 C Yes No No
Libya 2011 R Yes No No
Syria 2011 R No No No
Tunisia 2011 L Yes Yes Yes
Yemen 2011 R Yes No No
Egypt 2013 C Yes No No
Burkina Faso 2014 C Yes Yes n/a
Sources: Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project, Political Regime Character-
istics and Transitions, 1800–2016,” 2017, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2016.xls; Henk 
Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Da-
taset of Political Leaders,” Journal of Peace Research 46 (March 2009): 269–83.
Note: L = Loyalty Shift; R = Repression; C = Military Coup. A detailed description of how 
endgames were identified is reported in the Appendix. Leader exit based on Archigos Da-
taset v4.1. Transition to democracy and democracy status based on Polity2 value (Polity2 
value of +6 or higher).
Table—MiliTary responses and poliTical ouTcoMes 
in nonviolenT Mass proTesTs, 1946–2014
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cases that we count from 2011 through 2014—these are the Arab Spring 
cases plus that of the small West African country of Burkina Faso in 
2014—the military chose repression or a coup in every instance save 
one. That sole exception came in Tunisia in 2011, when as we have seen 
the Tunisian army signaled its support for the protesters and induced the 
dictator to accept exile in Saudi Arabia. 
The endgames occurred in every world region that has a significant 
number of autocracies, with clusters taking place in (post)communist 
Eurasia (the “velvet revolutions” and “color revolutions”), the Asia Pa-
cific (“people power revolutions”), and the broader Middle East (the 
Arab Spring cases). These are also the regions where, as researchers 
have recently noted, civil-resistance campaigns have been most likely to 
be met with military repression.12
Popular protests in authoritarian regimes can lead not only to differ-
ent reactions from military establishments, but also to vastly different 
outcomes in terms of leader exit, regime survival, and democratization. 
As one might expect, a loyalty shift most often means that the authori-
tarian ruler will be gone within a year. The only cases of our forty in 
which this failed to happen came in Albania in 1990 and Madagascar 
in 1991. In the former, mass protests toward the end of the year forced 
communist ruler Ramiz Alia to initiate political liberalization, yet he did 
not resign the presidency until after the opposition’s sweeping victory 
in the March 1992 parliamentary balloting. In Madagascar, President 
Didier Ratsiraka conceded to protesters’ demands in October 1991 but 
stayed until he lost the February 1993 presidential runoff to opposition 
leader Albert Zafy. 
Equally important, loyalty shifts strongly correlate with a transition 
to democracy within three years, as well as the presence, within five 
years after the endgame, of a democratic political regime. In the four-
teen loyalty shifts found among the Table’s forty cases, the only ex-
ceptions to these correlations are South Korea (1960), Albania (1990), 
and Kyrgyzstan (2005). In that last case, the Tulip Revolution pushed 
authoritarian president Askar Akayev out of office, but his successor 
ruled as a dictator until armed riots toppled him in 2010. In South Ko-
rea, the demise of the Syngman Rhee regime in the course of the 1960 
student protests led to a brief democratic interregnum before General 
Park Chung-hee organized a military coup and institutionalized a form 
of personal rule that lasted until his assassination in 1979.
Military coups always cause leader exit, although “the perpetrators 
of coups tend to oust dictators only to impose new ones.”13 Egypt’s 
trajectory after the 2011 uprising is a typical example. The Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces took power after pressing Mubarak to quit 
the presidency in February 2011. The military permitted elections, but 
in July 2013, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ousted President Mohamed 
Morsi in another coup. In 2014, Sisi secured election as president, and 
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he was reelected in March 2018 while an ailing Morsi watched from 
a prison cell. In the Table’s six coups, spanning the years from 1969 
(Pakistan) to 2014 (Burkina Faso), the toppling of a dictator four times 
led to the installation of a fresh 
dictator. Even where a transition 
to democracy followed a military 
coup, as in Pakistan in 1969 and 
in Sudan in 1985, the democratic 
regime was short-lived and fell to 
another military intervention. 
Yet repression alone cannot 
make an autocrat’s tenure secure. 
In twelve of the nineteen cases 
where militaries used brutal force, 
the incumbent nevertheless fell, 
most often due to pressure from 
inside the regime coalition and 
shifting patterns of political allegiance and power. In Poland in 1970, 
for example, the army and the national police bloodily suppressed a 
shipyard-workers’ uprising, but First Secretary W³adys³aw Gomu³ka’s 
career could not survive the troubles—his colleagues in the commu-
nist Politburo soon pushed him out. Similarly, the Iranian monarchy 
collapsed despite military repression when the ailing Shah Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi fled into exile in 1978. 
In the cases of Venezuela in 1958 and Thailand in 1973, repression 
did not prevent a transition to democracy. In the former, a violent 
crackdown on the popular uprising by parts of the deeply factionalized 
armed forces could not save the military dictatorship. Internal rivalries 
and widespread discontent with President Marcos Pérez Jiménez trig-
gered mutinies and defections among the disgruntled soldiers. Having 
lost the loyalty of vast parts of the military, Pérez Jiménez fled into 
exile. In the latter, when students in Bangkok inspired large crowds 
to challenge Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn’s rule, soldiers used 
lethal force against them. Yet King Bhumibol Adulyadej intervened, 
and Thanom soon resigned as premier and left the country. Almost 
two decades later, in May 1992, hundreds of thousands of Thai citi-
zens demonstrated against the military junta led by General Suchinda 
Kraprayoon. The military cracked down hard, but again the palace 
weighed in and made the dictator step down.
Overall, fewer than half of all endgames (48 percent) led to a demo-
cratic transition, while in only 45 percent of all endgame cases was a 
democracy in place five years after this scenario’s key events. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, scholars of transition expressed skepticism about 
the value of pressure from below and even portrayed mass mobilization 
as likely to harm democratization prospects.14 Yet more recent students 
The very fact of sustained 
mass protests signals a 
dictator’s weakness. It 
becomes highly likely 
either that the troops will 
refuse to act against the 
demonstrators or that the 
generals will step in and 
force a change of ruler.
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of “democratic revolutions” and nonviolent campaigns argue that popu-
lar pressure has in case after case been a key to bringing about political 
liberalization and subsequent democratization.15 Another and still more 
recent study has suggested that military coups or even the threat of same 
can help to usher in democracy, though statistical analysts have disputed 
this notion.16
Our own analysis, which deals only with nonviolent mass protests, 
cannot resolve that controversy. Yet our work does offer three major in-
sights. First, we have shown that when military leaders opt for a loyalty 
shift in response to nonviolent mass protests, the implications for subse-
quent democratization are positive. Loyalty shifts have a good record of 
producing transitions to democracy within three years, and of sustaining 
democratization. This is true even though the involvement of military 
elites in regime change can spawn new problems for democratization. 
These may include the creation of “reserved domains” that exempt the 
military from civilian authority, not to mention the acquisition by gener-
als of veto power over key political decisions.17 
In seven of the fourteen countries in which a loyalty shift opened 
the door to a democratic transition, military establishments were able 
to carve out significant privileges as that transition took place. Mili-
tary coups overthrew democratic governments in South Korea in 1961 
and in Madagascar in 2009, while in Argentina and the Philippines 
democratic governments struggled to survive a series of military 
coup attempts and mutinies. In Bangladesh, Indonesia, and post-1987 
South Korea as well, democratic transitions failed (at least in the short 
term) to bring the armed forces fully under the control of democrati-
cally chosen civil authorities. Only in Malawi and some communist 
or postcommunist countries, such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Kyrgyzstan, Romania, and Serbia, did military leaders fail to claim a 
special niche during and after the transition to democracy. These were 
all societies in which the military historically wielded little political 
power.
Our second insight is that the empirical evidence provided by dicta-
tors’ endgames does not support the idea that coups improve prospects 
for democracy. Unlike a loyalty shift, a military coup during a nonvio-
lent revolution has only rarely opened a path to sustained democratiza-
tion. Rather, the typical military coup during an endgame leads to some 
form of renewed authoritarianism. 
Finally, our finding that nearly four-fifths (78 percent) of all end-
games lead to the dictator’s exit points to something important: Dicta-
tors who fail to forestall popular mobilizations are ripe for takedown.18 
The very fact of sustained mass protests signals a dictator’s weakness. 
It becomes highly likely either that the troops will refuse to act against 
the demonstrators or that the generals will step in and force a change of 
ruler. Even if a dictator can motivate the military to attack the protesters, 
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there is still a high chance that the dictator will wind up losing office and 
suffering exile or perhaps even death. 
Explaining Military Reactions
What, then, can tell us how militaries will respond to popular pro-
tests? Recent studies have suggested some answers. The factors to be 
weighed include the type of authoritarian regime; the strategies carried 
out by autocrats to prevent military groups from seizing power via a 
coup d’état (“coup-proofing”); the diversity of the social movement and 
the social distance between soldiers and protesters; and whether sol-
diers were responsible for large-scale human-rights violations prior to 
the endgame.19 
Type of authoritarian regime. The data in the Table in the Appendix 
(online) suggest that endgames in military regimes hold a higher likeli-
hood of military repression compared to endgames in other types of 
autocratic regimes.20 In nine of twelve endgames that occurred in mili-
tary-led regimes, the military-as-institution used violence to defend the 
military-as-government—for instance during the “Black May” (1992) 
crackdown by the Thai military, which killed dozens of protesters, in-
jured hundreds more, and placed thousands in detention. By contrast, 
only in five of fourteen endgames in party-led dictatorships (36 percent) 
and three of twelve endgames in personalistic regimes did the military 
respond with repression. These findings are consistent with the broader 
scholarly literature on state repression, which emphasizes that regimes 
dominated by specialists in managing violence are less likely to be good 
at stopping mass protest before it starts, and are more likely to react with 
sweeping violence if and when large-scale protest does occur.21
Coup-proofing. Dictators can apply a wide variety of coup-proofing 
measures. The most common are counterbalancing (“structural coup-
proofing”) and ascriptive selection (that is, stacking key units with eth-
nic or other loyalists).22 
Counterbalancing involves the creation of parallel military organiza-
tions and aims to hamper the military’s potential to act in a unified and 
coherent way against the dictator. Of the 40 dictatorships surveyed, 28 
had at least one security agency controlling, spying on, or otherwise 
balancing the military. Examples include the Revolutionary Guards in 
Iran and the Seguridad Nacional of military-ruled Venezuela (1952–58).
Ascriptive selection aims to maximize military loyalty by staffing a 
part or the whole of the military with soldiers from the dictator’s own 
ethnic group, religious sect, tribe, or region. This mechanism is espe-
cially, but not exclusively, effective in ethnic-minority regimes.23 An 
example of this model is the small island kingdom of Bahrain. There, 
the Sunni royal family has recruited a mercenary army filled with Sun-
nis from outside Bahrain to keep a mostly Shia society in line. In Syria, 
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the Assad family filled senior and sensitive military posts with relatives, 
members of the same minority religious sect (the Alawites), members 
of other religious minorities, and natives of the Assads’ home region. 
In South Korea, one of the world’s most ethnically homogenous soci-
eties, dictators Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan (Park’s successor) 
favored a certain group of graduates from the Korea Military Academy. 
These were the members of the hanahoe or “Number One” faction, a 
group of officers who hailed almost exclusively from the two presidents’ 
shared home province of Kyongsang in the southeast of the country. By 
contrast, neither Tunisia’s Ben Ali nor Egypt’s Mubarak (each of whom 
had a military background) infiltrated the armed forces with personal 
loyalists from a particular ethnic, religious, or regional group. 
Counterbalancing carries the risk of harming military effectiveness 
by sowing rivalries within the armed forces, and it can breed resentment 
among parts of the military that feel disfavored.24 Loyalist-stacking is 
a surer means of keeping the military “on side,” for it cuts off military 
leaders from the junior soldiery and the broader society and ties their 
survival prospects to those of the dictator. In fact, the data in Table 2 
suggest that counterbalancing is a blunt instrument for dictators trying 
to survive their endgame: Only 12 of the 28 dictators in our dataset who 
used some form of counterbalancing actually induced their militaries 
to defend them when the crisis came. Rather, counterbalancing might 
actually breed military grievances and thereby make coup-plotting more 
likely. Something like this appears to have happened in Egypt (2011) 
and four other cases. In eleven additional cases where dictators had been 
using counterbalancing, including those of Romania (1989) and Tunisia 
(2011), militaries shifted their loyalty. 
Compare this to the record of ascriptive selection. In eleven of the 
seventeen cases where military leaders had been specially selected to 
ensure their loyalty, the armed forces cracked down on the protests. Ex-
cept for a few cases such as the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987), 
and Kyrgyzstan (2005), militaries whose top ranks were stacked with 
loyalists stuck with the dictator throughout the crisis.
The composition of nonviolent protest movements. Some scholars ar-
gue that how a military will react to popular protests depends on the inter-
nal characteristics of the opposition movement. According to this reason-
ing, demonstrators who are nonviolent, who rally in urban settings, and 
who come from an ethnoreligious, regional, or class background which 
resembles that of many soldiers will be less likely to face harsh mili-
tary action. Indeed, the existence of affinities and similarities between the 
troops and the protesters will raise the probability that military officers 
and opposition leaders will begin to form common networks. It will also 
help if the demonstrations are broad-based and demographically diverse, 
featuring women as well as men and involving citizens of varying ages. 
Orders to unleash violence against a movement that meets such cri-
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teria could fill military leaders with worry that discipline will collapse 
if repression is tried. Given how much value militaries place upon co-
hesion, such a movement will have a good chance of inducing the mili-
tary to shift its loyalty rather than resort to arms in the streets. Looking 
at things from the dictator’s point of view, conversely, one can see the 
reason for loyalist-stacking. Staffing senior ranks and elite units (or 
perhaps even the whole military) with members of a regime-aligned 
ethnic or other minority will widen the social distance between the 
military and the general populace and preclude networking. Demon-
strators can be disparaged as mischiefmakers, radicals, and “enemies 
of the nation.”25 
The protests that broke out in South Korea in May 1980 featured 
leftist students, members of illegal unions, and locals in the city of 
Kwangju, the capital of Cholla Province in the southwestern corner of 
the peninsula. President Chun Doo-hwan sent troops from Kyongsang to 
put them down; the bloody clashes that ensued cost hundreds of lives. In 
Bahrain, the Arab Spring protesters were mainly Shia while those who 
suppressed them were Sunni. In Syria, a “minoritized” senior officer 
corps and set of crack units attacked demonstrators who came mainly 
from the country’s disadvantaged and politically marginalized Sunni 
majority. 
Seven years after the failed Kwangju demonstrations, South Korea’s 
successful democratization movement manifested itself in all regions 
of the country and drew support from a broad cross-section of society, 
including the urban middle classes. Much the same was true of the 1986 
“people power” movement in the Philippines and the so-called 8-8-88 
Uprising in Burma. In the former, most of the action unfolded in Manila, 
but the effort to oust dictator Ferdinand Marcos united the poor and the 
middle classes, workers, social activists, business groups, the Catholic 
Church, and the communist-led National Democratic Front.
While social diversity might explain different patterns of military 
responses vis-`a-vis unarmed (as distinguished from armed and hence 
less diverse) movements, a nonviolent movement’s internal diversity 
does not seem to be a good predictor of how a military establishment 
will respond to it. In 19 of 21 cases where there was a loyalty shift, the 
nonviolent campaign was diverse, inclusive, and not too different from 
the military in its composition. Yet much the same was true in 15 of the 
19 cases where repression occurred. Movement diversity tells us little 
about how a military is likely to react to a protest movement. 
Past human-rights violations by the military. A third factor is wheth-
er military leaders must worry that the dictator’s downfall will lead to 
the exposure and punishment of human-rights violations committed un-
der the authoritarian regime. Military leaders who can be confident that 
they will not face such a risk are more likely to go over to the protesters’ 
side. Hence a military with little or no record of involvement in tor-
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ture, extralegal killings, or forced population movements is more likely 
to defect. The armies of the East European communist countries and 
Ben Ali’s Tunisia, for example, mostly stayed out of internal-security 
work—the regimes had other, specialized agencies to handle it—and 
could not be counted among dictatorship’s mainstays. By contrast, the 
militaries of Burma and Syria will have much to fear if accountability 
ever comes to either of those places. 
There have been exceptions, of course. The armed forces of Argen-
tina had been waging a covert “dirty war” against their own society for 
years, yet chose to retreat from power rather than repress after losing 
the Falklands War to Great Britain in 1982. In communist Poland (1956) 
and China (1989), conversely, the armies had no history of large-scale 
human-rights abuses yet gunned down demonstrators when called in to 
do so. 
Overall, however, the data support the idea that having a military 
with “clean hands” makes repression less likely: Of the 25 militaries 
in our dataset with troubling human-rights records, 14 tried to repress 
protests. Those represent, moreover, three-fourths of all our repression 
cases. Looking at the six coups in our set of instances, we see that tar-
nished militaries were behind five of them. 
Endgames can result in a wide variety of outcomes. This is true in 
terms of both military responses and the short- and medium-term ef-
fects that we see in the area of leader survival versus regime change. 
No single factor can perfectly predict how a military will respond to a 
dictator’s endgame, and some factors seem hardly to have any explana-
tory power at all. At the very least, this suggests that military responses 
to dictators’ endgames are likely to be shaped by causal factors that 
interact in complex, nondeterministic ways. In addition to the factors 
discussed above, scholars have proposed other possible explanations 
that revolve around the military’s formal or informal missions and its 
participation in international alliances and officer-exchange programs 
with democratic countries and their armies.26 Conceptualizing many of 
these factors is a challenge, however, to say nothing of the task of col-
lecting reliable empirical data of the sort needed to make enlightening 
comparisons.
Dictators’ endgames are complicated and chaotic affairs. Leaders on 
all sides must contend with limited information and high uncertainty. 
The risk of mistakes, miscalculations, and ad hoc decisions is high, and 
no single theoretical model is likely to be able to capture and explain it 
all. Nonetheless, we believe that embracing the challenge of more rigor-
ous theoretical analysis can advance our understanding of the dynamics 
of dictators’ endgames as well as their relevance for the political devel-
opment and (possible) democratic future of authoritarian regimes.
Mindful of the risks of overgeneralizing from a limited number of 
cases, we nonetheless believe that if one knows enough about how each 
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of the factors discussed here manifests itself in a given country, one 
can make a highly educated guess about how that country’s military 
will respond to an endgame scenario. We cannot predict if and when 
such a scenario will occur, but we can assist international actors who 
want to support democratization in grasping how they can best promote 
democracy-friendly conditions once a nonviolent revolution breaks out. 
Knowing who the different types of actors are and what their incentives 
and interests are likely to be could prove valuable indeed as Western 
decision makers search for measures that will give the democratic pos-
sibility its best chance of success in an uncertain world.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements 
in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Sharon Erick-
son Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); and Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil 
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2011).
2. For an exemplary study that analyzes the military as a part of the wider coercive 
apparatus, see Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive 
Institutions and State Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
3. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 46–51; Philipp M. Lutscher, 
“The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defec-
tion During Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” International Interactions 42, no. 2 (2016): 
350–75.
4. Exceptions are Chenoweth and Stephan, who analyze security and elite defection in 
situations of nonviolent conflict, and Zoltan Barany’s study of how militaries have reacted 
to peaceful revolutions. See Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 49–51; 
Zoltan Barany, How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2016). 
5. Andreas Schedler, “Disturbing the Dictator: Peaceful Protest Under Authoritarian-
ism,” in Johannes Gerschewski and Christoph H. Stefes, eds., Crisis in Autocratic Re-
gimes (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2018), 43–74.
6. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, “How Autocracies Fall,” Washington 
Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2014): 36–39.
7. Florence Gaub, “The Libyan Armed Forces Between Coup-Proofing and Repres-
sion,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 221–44; Kevin Koehler, Dorothy Ohl, 
and Holger Albrecht, “From Disaffection to Desertion: How Networks Facilitate Military 
Insubordination in Civil Conflict,” Comparative Politics 48 (July 2016): 439–57.
8. Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer, “The ‘Dictator’s Endgame’: 
Explaining Military Behavior in Nonviolent Anti-Incumbent Mass Protests,” Democracy 
and Security 14, no. 2 (2018): 174–99.
9. David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, “Staying Quartered: Ci-
vilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century,” Comparative 
Political Studies 47 (February 2014): 230–59. 
155Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer
10. Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and 
Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (June 2014): 313–31.
11. Appendix, www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material.
12. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 51.
13. George Derpanopoulos et al., “Are Coups Good for Democracy?” Research and 
Politics 3 (January–March 2016): 1–7.
14. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
15. Mark R. Thompson, Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe (London: 
Routledge, 2004); Mauricio Rivera Celestino and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Fresh Car-
nations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies,” 
Journal of Peace Research 50 (May 2013): 385–400.
16. Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” British Journal of 
Political Science 44 (October 2014): 799–825; Derpanopoulos et al., “Are Coups Good 
for Democracy?”
17. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “The Military’s Role in Politics,” in Jennifer 
Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, eds., Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political In-
stitutions (London: Routledge, 2015), 218–35.
18. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, “Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Au-
tocracies,” Washington Quarterly 37 (Winter 2015): 71–84; Karrie J. Koesel and Valerie 
J. Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Mo-
bilizations Against Authoritarian Rulers,” Perspectives on Politics 11 (September 2013): 
753–68.
19. For overviews, see Barany, How Armies Respond; Risa A. Brooks, “Mili-
tary Defection and the Arab Spring,” Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Politics, 2017, 
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-26.
20. See the Appendix at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material.
21. Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 10 (2007): 1–23; Greitens, Dictators and Their Secret Police.
22. James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle 
East,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999): 131–65; Adrian Florea, “Spatial Rivalry and 
Coups Against Dictators,” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2018): 1–26.
23. Cameron S. Brown, Christopher J. Fariss, and R. Blake McMahon, “Recouping 
After Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution,” 
International Interactions 42, no. 1 (2016): 1–30; Florea, “Spatial Rivalry.”
24. Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better?”
25. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works; Nepstad, Nonviolent Revo-
lutions; Fruzsina Tófalvi, “Military Disloyalty and Regime Change,” CEU Political Sci-
ence Journal 8 (February 2013): 79–107; Greitens, Dictators and Their Secret Police.
26. Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham, “Staying Quartered”; Barany, How Armies 
Respond; Dennis C. Blair, “Military Support for Democracy,” Prism 3 (June 2012): 3–21.
